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1 Introduction
In the theory of cooperative TU games, the investigation of relations among different set valued solu-
tions is crucial for a better understanding of these solutions. The core (Gillies (1953)) of a TU game is
the set of all efficient allocations that are coalitional stable. In other words, all the core allocations are
coalitional stable in the sense that there is no coalition S with incentives to split off. The core cover (Tijs
and Lipperts, 1982) is the set of all efficient allocations satisfying that every player receives neither more
than his utopia payoff, nor less than his minimal right. Both set valued solutions are convex polytopes
and therefore can be described by the convex hull of their extreme points. Besides, when the game is
convex, the set of extreme points of the core coincides with the set of marginal vectors (Shapley, 1953;
Ichiishi, 1981). Quant et al (2005) showed that the extreme points of the core cover of admissible games
are the larginal vectors. Recently, Platz et al (2011) characterize sets of larginal vectors satisfying that the
game is compromise stable if, and only if, every larginal vector of the set is in the core.
As the name implies, the core cover is a core catcher. The games with a non-empty core cover satis-
fying that all core cover allocations are coalitional stable are called compromise stable games, that is, for
this subclass of games, the core and the core cover coincide. The subclass of compromise stable games
contains both convex and not convex games. Quant et al (2005) showed that convex compromise sta-
ble games are strategically equivalent to bankruptcy games (O’Neill, 1982 and Aumann and Maschler,
1985).
Our aim is to investigate new relations between the core cover of compromise admissible games and
the core of bankruptcy games. Our main contribution here is Theorem 4, where we show that the core
cover of a compromise admissible game is a translation of the core of a particular associated bankruptcy
game. Therefore, the core cover of a compromise admissible game is, up to a translation, the set of
coalitional stable allocations captured by the associated bankruptcy game.
Shapley (1971) studied in detail the core of convex games. Recently, González-Díaz and Sánchez-
Rodríguez (2008) further analyzed the core of convex games by introducing face games. Given a game
(N, v) with a non-empty core and a coalition T ⊂ N, a T-face game is defined in such a way that the
core of this T-face game coincides with the core allocations of the game (N, v) that provide the best
payoff for coalition T and the worst payoff for its complementary coalition N \ T. González-Díaz and
Sánchez-Rodríguez (2008) showed that the core of convex games can be rebuilt with the cores of the face
games. Any face game is related to a specific coalition T, and there are so many face games as coalitions.
In this paper, we establish that all bankruptcy face games are new bankruptcy games. Combining the
results of González-Díaz and Sánchez-Rodríguez (2008) and Theorem 4, we obtain that the core cover
of a compromise admissible game can also be rebuilt with the core covers of some specific bankruptcy
games.
Several rules for bankruptcy problems have been redefined in the context of compromise admissible
games: the adjusted proportional rule (τ value) in González-Díaz et al (2005), the Talmud rule (nucleo-
lus) in Quant et al (2005), and the run to the bank rule (the Shapley value) in Quant et al (2006). Here,
we consider a general formula, which is already used in the papers previously mentioned, for extending
bankruptcy rules to the class of compromise admissible games. It turns out that, if the bankruptcy rule
is invariant under claims truncation, then, the corresponding value always belongs to the core cover.
Particularly, we consider the constrained equal awards rule (CEA) and show that its associated value
for compromise admissible games belongs to the core cover of a specific T-face game of an associated
bankruptcy game.
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Another goal of this paper is to show the complexity of the core cover with regard to the maximal
number of extreme points. It is well known that for an n-player game, n! is the maximal number of
extreme core allocations. With the exception of 3-player games, the maximal number of extreme core
cover vertices is strictly less than n!. As an example, for a 7-player game, the upper bound is 140, much
less than 7! = 5040 (maximal number of marginal vectors). In this paper, we derive the precise upper
bound of the number of extreme points of the core cover.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the basic definitions and notations. We
analyze, in Section 3, the relation between the core cover and the core of the associated bankruptcy
game, and introduce and study the CEA value for compromise admissible games. Section 4 is devoted
to the study of the complexity of the core cover. Finally, in Section 5, we conclude with a summary of
the major contributions of this paper.
2 Preliminaries
A cooperative n-player game with transferable utility, shortly a TU game, is an ordered pair (N, v) where N
is a finite set (the set of players) with |N| = n and v : 2N → R is a function assigning, to each coalition
S ⊆ N, a payoff v(S); by convention, v(∅) = 0. Let Gn be the set of n-player TU games. Given S ⊆ N,
let |S| be the number of players in S.
A TU game (N, v) ∈ Gn is said to be additive if there exists a vector a ∈ Rn such that v(S) = ∑i∈S ai
for all S ⊆ N. The game (N, v) is then denoted by (N, a). A TU game (N, v) ∈ Gn is strategically equivalent
to another TU game (N,w) ∈ Gn if there exists a scalar k > 0 and an additive game (N, a) ∈ Gn such
that w = a+ kv. A value is a function ϕ : Gn −→ Rn that assigns to each TU game (N, v) ∈ Gn a vector
ϕ(N, v) ∈ Rn.
The core (Gillies, 1953) of a cooperative TU-game (N, v) is defined as
C(v) =
{
x ∈ Rn : ∑
i∈N
xi = v(N),∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S) for all S ⊂ N
}
,
that is, the core is the set of efficient allocations of v(N) such that there is no coalition with an incentive
to split off. A game is said to be balanced (see Bondareva, 1963; Shapley, 1967) if the core is nonempty.
Let BGn be the set of n-player balanced TU games.
An important subclass of balanced games is the class of convex games (see Shapley, 1971). A game
(N, v) is said to be convex if v(S) + v(T) ≤ v(S ∪ T) + v(S ∩ T) for all S, T ⊂ N. Let CGn be the set of
n-player convex TU games.
Given S ⊆ N, an order of the players in S is a bijection σS : {1, . . . , |S|} → S, where σS(k) is the player
in S that is in position k. We denote byΠ(S) the set of all orders of the players in S. For S = N, we denote
σ instead of σS. Given σ ∈ Π(N) and a player σ(k) ∈ N we denote Pσ(σ(k)) = {σ(1), . . . , σ(k− 1)}. For
σ ∈ Π(N), we define the inverse order of σ, σin ∈ Π(N), as the order satisfying σin(k) = σ(n− k+ 1), for
every k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let (N, v) ∈ Gn and σ ∈ Π(N). The marginal vector associated with (N, v) and σ,
mσ(v), is defined, for each k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, by mσ
σ(k)(v) = v({σ(1), . . . , σ(k)})− v({σ(1), . . . , σ(k− 1)}).
It is known that convexity of a game is equivalent to every marginal vector being a core element and,
moreover, C(v) = con{mσ(v) : σ ∈ Π(N)}1 (see Shapley, 1953; Ichiishi, 1981).
Next, we recall the terminology used in Shapley (1971) and in González-Díaz and Sánchez-Rodríguez
(2008). Let (N, v) ∈ BGn. For each ∅ 6= T ⊆ N, let HT be the hyperplane HT = {x ∈ Rn : ∑i∈T xi =
1 Given a finite set A ⊂ Rn, con(A) represents the convex hull of A.
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v(T)}. Next, for T ⊂ N, let FT = C(v) ∩ HN\T . Clearly, F∅ = C(v). For convenience, we define FN =
C(v). For convex games, each FT is a nonempty face of C(v) and we refer to FT as the T-face of C(v). By
definition, for each allocation in FT , coalition T receives v(N) − v(N \ T). Clearly, for each ∅ 6= T ⊂
N, since both FT and FN\T lie in HN , they are parallel to each other. Subsequently, we recall, for each
coalition T ⊆ N, the T-face game (N, vFT ) that is closely related to FT . The T-face game (González-Díaz
and Sánchez-Rodríguez, 2008) (N, vFT ) is defined, for each S ⊆ N, as
vFT (S) = v
(
(S ∩ T) ∪ (N \ T)
)
− v
(
N \ T
)
+ v
(
S ∩ (N \ T)
)
.
Face games were introduced in González-Díaz and Sánchez-Rodríguez (2008) in order to analyze the
core of convex and strictly convex games. Hence, the idea behind the T-face game of a convex game
(N, v) is the following. FT are the best core allocations for coalition T and the worst ones for coalition N \
T since coalition T always receives v(N)− v(N \ T) and coalition N \ T gets exactly v(N \ T). Moreover,
note that there is still freedom for v(N)− v(N \ T) to be shared among the players in T and for v(N \ T)
to be shared among the players in N \ T.
Proposition 1 (González-Díaz and Sánchez-Rodríguez, 2008) Let (N, v) ∈ CGn and let T ⊆ N. Then,
C(vFT ) = FT . Therefore, C(v) = con{C(vFT ) : ∅ 6= T ⊂ N}.
Following Tijs and Lipperts (1982), the utopia vector of a TU game (N, v), M(v) ∈ Rn, is defined by
Mi(v) = v(N)− v(N \ {i}) for all i ∈ N. The minimum right vector m(v) ∈ Rn is defined, for all i ∈ N,
by
mi(v) = max
S⊆N, i∈S
v(S)− ∑
j∈S\{i}
Mj(v)
 .
The core cover (Tijs and Lipperts, 1982) of a TU game (N, v) consists of all allocations of v(N) giving
each player at least his minimum right, but no more than his utopia payoff:
CC(v) =
{
x ∈ Rn : ∑
i∈N
xi = v(N), m(v) ≤ x ≤ M(v)
}
.
A TU game is called compromise admissible if it has a nonempty core cover. Let CAn be the set of n-player
compromise admissible TU games. Let us note that CGn ⊂ CAn. Mathematically, a TU game (N, v) is
compromise admissible if
m(v) ≤ M(v) and ∑
i∈N
mi(v) ≤ v(N) ≤ ∑
i∈N
Mi(v).
The extreme points of the core cover are called larginal vectors or larginals (see Quant et al, 2005). Let
(N, v) ∈ CAn and σ ∈ Π(N). The larginal vector `σ(v) is the allocation of v(N) that gives the utopia
payoffs to the first players with respect to σ as long as it is still possible to assign the remaining players
their minimum rights:
`σσ(k)(v) =

Mσ(k)(v) if ∑
k
r=1 Mσ(r)(v) +∑
n
r=k+1 mσ(r)(v) ≤ v(N),
mσ(k)(v) if ∑
k−1
r=1 Mσ(r)(v) +∑
n
r=k mσ(r)(v) ≥ v(N),
v(N)−
k−1
∑
r=1
Mσ(r)(v)−
n
∑
r=k+1
mσ(r)(v) otherwise,
for every k = 1, . . . , n.
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It is well-known that, for all compromise admissible game (N, v), C(v) ⊆ CC(v) (Tijs and Lipperts,
1982). A TU game (N, v) ∈ CAn is said to be compromise stable (see Quant et al, 2005) if C(v) = CC(v).
Theorem 1 (Quant et al, 2005) A TU game (N, v) ∈ CAn is compromise stable if, and only if, for all ∅ 6= S ⊆
N,
v(S) ≤ max
∑i∈Smi(v), v(N)− ∑i∈N\SMi(v)
 .
A bankruptcy problem (cf. O’Neill, 1982; Aumann and Maschler, 1985) is a triple (N, E, d), where E ≥ 0
is the estate to be divided and d ∈ Rn+ is the vector of claims satisfying ∑i∈N di ≥ E. The corresponding
bankruptcy game (N, v) is defined, for each S ⊆ N, by
v(S) = max
0, E− ∑
j∈N\S
dj
 .
We denote the class of bankruptcy problems with n players by BRn. The class of bankruptcy games is
a proper subclass of CGn. A bankruptcy rule is a function f : BRn −→ Rn+ assigning to each bankruptcy
problem (N, E, d) ∈ BRn a payoff vector f (N, E, d) ∈ Rn+ such that∑i∈N fi(N, E, d) = E and fi(N, E, d) ≤
di for every i ∈ N.
Let us note that there exist compromise stable TU games that are not convex and that there exist
convex TU games which are not compromise stable. The next theorem, due to Quant et al (2005), relates
bankruptcy games with convex and compromise stable games.
Theorem 2 (Quant et al, 2005) A TU game is both convex and compromise stable if, and only if, it is strategi-
cally equivalent to a bankruptcy game.
3 The structure of the core cover via bankruptcy games
The main result of this section is the relation between the core cover of a compromise admissible game
and the core of an associated bankruptcy game. Based on this relation, we define the family of values
on the class of compromise admissible games that arise from bankruptcy rules. It is shown that, if the
bankruptcy rule is invariant under claims truncation, then, the corresponding value on the class of com-
promise admissible games belongs to the core cover of the game. Particularly, we study the constrained
equal awards (CEA) value and show that it always belongs to the core of a specific face game of the
associated bankruptcy game.
The next lemma describes the contribution of a player to any coalition in a bankruptcy game.
Lemma 1 Let (N, E, d) be a bankruptcy problem and (N, v) be the associated TU game. For each i ∈ N and each
S ⊆ N \ {i},
v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) = min {di, v(S ∪ {i})} .
Proof Let i ∈ N and S ⊆ N \ {i}. If v(S) = 0, then, E − ∑j∈N\S dj ≤ 0 and, consequently, E −
∑j∈N\(S∪{i}) dj ≤ di. Since v(S ∪ {i}) = max{0, E−∑j∈N\(S∪{i}) dj}, it follows
v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) = v(S ∪ {i}) = min {di, v(S ∪ {i})} .
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If v(S) > 0, then, v(S) = E− ∑j∈N\S dj > 0 and, consequently, 0 ≤ di < E− ∑j∈N\(S∪{i}) dj. Since
v(S ∪ {i}) = max{0, E−∑j∈N\(S∪{i}) dj}, it follows
v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) = E− ∑
j∈N\(S∪{i})
dj − (E− ∑
j∈N\S
dj) = di = min {di, v(S ∪ {i})} .uunionsq
Given a compromise admissible TU game (N, v), we can associate a bankruptcy problem and the
corresponding bankruptcy game to (N, v) as follows.
Definition 1 Let (N, v) ∈ CAn. We define the associated bankruptcy problem, (N, E, d), as
E = v(N)− ∑
j∈N
mj(v) and d = M(v)−m(v).
We denote by (N, v¯) the corresponding bankruptcy game.
Note that the game (N, v¯) in Definition 1 is, indeed, a bankruptcy game since m(v) ≤ M(v) and
∑i∈N mi(v) ≤ v(N) ≤ ∑i∈N Mi(v). Besides, Theorem 1 can be rewritten as follows. A TU game (N, v) ∈
CAn is compromise stable if, and only if, for all ∅ 6= S ⊆ N, v(S) ≤ ∑i∈S mi(v) + v¯(S), where (N, v¯) is
the bankruptcy game of Definition 1.
Theorem 3 Let (N, v) ∈ CAn, (N, v¯) be its associated bankruptcy game, and σ ∈ Π(N). Then, `σ(v) =
m(v) +mσ
in
(v¯).
Proof Let k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, it follows, by definition of σin, that σin(n− k+ 1) = σ(k) and Pσin(σin(n− k+
1)) = {σin(1), σin(2), . . . , σin(n− k)} = {σ(n), σ(n− 1), . . . , σ(k+ 1)}. Therefore,
mσ
in
σ(k)(v¯) = m
σin
σin(n−k+1)(v¯)
= v¯(Pσin(σ
in(n− k+ 1)) ∪ {σin(n− k+ 1)})− v¯(Pσin(σin(n− k+ 1)))
= v¯({σ(n), σ(n− 1), . . . , σ(k)})− v¯({σ(n), σ(n− 1), . . . , σ(k+ 1)}) (1)
= min{dσ(k), v¯({σ(n), σ(n− 1), . . . , σ(k)})}
= min{dσ(k), max{0, E−
k−1
∑
l=1
dσ(l)}}
= min{Mσ(k) −mσ(k), max{0, v(N)−
k−1
∑
l=1
Mσ(l)(v)−
n
∑
l=k
mσ(l)(v)}}
where the fourth equality follows by Lemma 1.
Following the three cases in the definition of larginals, we distinguish between three possible situa-
tions:
1. v(N)−∑k−1l=1 Mσ(l)(v)−∑nl=k mσ(l)(v) ≤ 0.
In this case `σ
σ(k)(v) = mσ(k)(v). Moreover, we obtain m
σin
σ(k)(v¯) = 0 by Expression (1).
2. 0 < v(N)−∑k−1l=1 Mσ(l)(v)−∑nl=k mσ(l)(v) < Mσ(k)(v)−mσ(k)(v).
In this case, `σ
σ(k)(v) = v(N) − ∑k−1l=1 Mσ(l)(v) − ∑nl=k+1 mσ(l)(v). Moreover, we obtain mσ
in
σ(k)(v¯) =
v(N)−∑k−1l=1 Mσ(l)(v)−∑nl=k mσ(l)(v) by Expression (1).
3. Mσ(k)(v)−mσ(k)(v) ≤ v(N)−∑k−1l=1 Mσ(l)(v)−∑nl=k mσ(l)(v).
In this case, `σ
σ(k)(v) = Mσ(k)(v). Moreover, we obtain m
σin
σ(k)(v¯) = Mσ(k)(v) − mσ(k)(v) by Expres-
sion (1).
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Therefore, `σ(v) = m(v) +mσ
in
(v¯). uunionsq
Theorem 4 Let (N, v) ∈ CAn and (N, v¯) be its associated bankruptcy game. Then,
CC(v) = m(v) + C(v¯) = m(v) + CC(v¯).
Moreover, (N, v) is compromise stable if, and only if, C(v) = m(v) + C(v¯).
Proof The first part of the theorem follows from Theorem 3 and because (N, v¯) is a bankruptcy game.
The second part of the theorem straightforwardly follows from the definition of compromise stability.
uunionsq
Note that from Theorem 4 we also derive Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. Namely, the alternative proof for
Theorem 1 is the following. If for all ∅ 6= S ⊆ N, v(S) ≤ ∑i∈S mi(v) + v¯(S), then, m(v) + C(v¯) ⊆ C(v).
By Theorem 4, CC(v) = m(v) + C(v¯) ⊆ C(v), and then, C(v) = CC(v) and the game v is compromise
stable. Reciprocally, if v is compromise stable, then, C(v) = CC(v) = m(v) + C(v¯) where the last equality
follows from Theorem 4. Since the game m(v)+ v¯ is convex, for every S ⊂ N there is xS ∈ m(v)+ C(v¯) =
C(v) such that ∑i∈S xSi = ∑i∈S mi(v) + v¯(S). Then, ∑i∈S mi(v) + v¯(S) = ∑i∈S xSi ≥ v(S).
The alternative proof for Theorem 2 is the following. If (N, v) is convex and compromise stable,
then, the equality C(v) = m(v) + C(v¯) implies that v = m(v) + v¯, and, therefore, game v is strategically
equivalent to a bankruptcy game. Reciprocally, if v is strategically equivalent to a bankruptcy game,
then, clearly, v is convex and compromise stable.
Note that the second part of Theorem 4 can also be derived from the proof of Theorem 4.2 in Quant
et al (2005).
By Proposition 1, the core of a bankruptcy game can be rebuilt through the cores of the face games.
The following proposition shows that each face game of a bankruptcy game is strategically equivalent
to a bankruptcy game.
Proposition 2 Let (N, E, d) be a bankruptcy problem, (N, v) be the associated TU game, and T ⊆ N. Then, the
T-face game is strategically equivalent to a bankruptcy game in the following way: vFT = v˜+ a, where
1. ai = 0, for every i ∈ N, and v˜ is the bankruptcy game associated to the bankruptcy problem (N, E, d˜) where
d˜i = di, for every i ∈ T, and d˜i = 0, for every i ∈ N \ T if ∑i∈T di ≥ E.
2. ai = di, for every i ∈ T, and ai = 0, for every i ∈ N \ T, and v˜ is the bankruptcy game associated to the
bankruptcy problem (N, E−∑i∈T di, d˜) with d˜ = d− a if ∑i∈T di < E.
Proof Let T ⊆ N. The T-face game (N, vFT ) associated with the bankruptcy game (N, v) is defined, for
each S ⊆ N, by
vFT (S) = v
(
(S ∩ T) ∪ (N \ T))− v(N \ T)+ v(S ∩ (N \ T))
= max{0, E−∑j∈T\S dj} −max{0, E−∑j∈T dj}+ max{0, E−∑j∈(N\S)∪(S∩T) dj}.
1. ∑i∈T di ≥ E. In this case, it follows that E−∑j∈(N\S)∪(S∩T) dj ≤ 0 since (N \ S) ∪ (S ∩ T) = T ∪ (N \
(S ∪ T)). Therefore, v(N \ T) = v(S ∩ (N \ T)) = 0 and
vFT (S) = max{0, E− ∑
j∈T\S
dj}.
Hence,
vFT (S) =
0 if S ⊆ N \ Tmax{0, E−∑j∈T\S dj} if S ∩ T 6= ∅
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It is clear that vFT is the bankruptcy game associated to the bankruptcy problem (N, E, d˜), where
d˜i = di, for every i ∈ T, and d˜i = 0, for every i ∈ N \ T.
2. ∑i∈T di < E. Then,
vFT (S) = v((S ∩ T) ∪ (N \ T))− v(N \ T) + v(S ∩ (N \ T))
= E−∑j∈T\S dj − E+∑j∈T dj + max{0, E−∑j∈(N\S)∪(S∩T) dj}
= ∑j∈T∩S dj + max{0, E−∑j∈T dj −∑j∈N\(S∪T) dj}
It is clear that max{0, E−∑j∈T dj−∑j∈N\(S∪T) dj} is the bankruptcy game associated to the bankruptcy
problem (N, E˜, d˜), where E˜ = E−∑i∈T di, and d˜i = 0, for every i ∈ T, and d˜i = di, for every i ∈ N \ T.
uunionsq
The following theorem states that the core cover of a compromise admissible game can be rebuilt
with the core covers of the bankruptcy face games.
Theorem 5 Let (N, v) ∈ CAn and (N, v¯) be its associated bankruptcy game. Then,
CC(v) = m(v) + con{CC(v¯FT ) : T ⊂ N}.
Proof Combining the results in Theorem 4 and in Proposition 1, we rewrite the core cover of a compro-
mise admissible game (N, v) as
CC(v) = m(v) + con{C(v¯FT ) : T ⊂ N}.
By Proposition 2, for each T ⊂ N, it follows that v¯FT is a new bankruptcy game, and then, CC(v¯FT ) =
C(v¯FT ), which establishes the result. uunionsq
Theorem 4 suggests that we may allocate the value v(N) of a compromise admissible game among
the players in a reasonable way using bankruptcy rules. This has been done in González-Díaz et al
(2005) using the adjusted proportional rule (the τ value) and in Quant et al (2005) using the Talmud rule
(the nucleolus for compromise stable games). Following these two papers, Quant et al (2006) describe
a method to apply bankruptcy rules to compromise admissible games and study the run to the bank
rule and the Tal-family rules. A common property of all these bankruptcy rules is the property of invari-
ance under claims truncation. A bankruptcy rule f satisfies invariance under claims truncation if for every
bankruptcy problem (N, E, d), f (N, E, d) = f (N, E, d′), where d′i = min{E, di} for every i ∈ N. Curiel
et al (1987) show that a bankruptcy rule satisfies invariance under claims truncation if, and only if, the
allocation provided by the rule is always in the core of the associated bankruptcy game. We show that
if a bankruptcy rule satisfies invariance under claims truncation, then, the corresponding value always
provides allocations belonging to the core cover of compromise admissible games. Moreover, we inves-
tigate the CEA-value and show that the corresponding allocations always belong to a specific face of the
core cover of compromise admissible games.
Definition 2 Let (N, v) ∈ CAn, let (N, E, d) be its associated bankruptcy problem, and let f be a bankruptcy
rule. We define the f -value, ϕ f (N, v), as
ϕ f (N, v) = m(v) + f (N, E, d).
The following result is an immediate consequence of Theorem 5 in Curiel et al (1987) and Theorem 4
and, therefore, the proof is omitted.
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Theorem 6 Let (N, v) ∈ CAn and let f be a bankruptcy rule satisfying invariance under claims truncation.
Then, ϕ f (N, v) ∈ CC(v).
Subsequently, we consider the CEA-value which arises from the Constrained Equal Awards (CEA)
rule for bankruptcy problems and show that it always belongs to a face of the core cover. From now
on, given (N, v) a compromise admissible TU-game we assume, without loss of generality and for eas-
iness of exposition, that N = {1, . . . , n} and M1(v)−m1(v) ≤ M2(v)−m2(v) ≤ . . . ≤ Mn(v)−mn(v).
Given a bankruptcy problem (N, E, d), the constrained equal awards rule, CEA, provides an allocation
CEA(N, E, d) ∈ Rn defined as CEAi(N, E, d) = min{di,λ} for every i ∈ N, with λ chosen such
that ∑i∈N min{di,λ} = E. Given a compromise admissible TU-game (N, v) and (N, E, d) the associ-
ated bankruptcy problem, we denote by k(v) ∈ N the player satisfying CEAi(N, E, d) = di for every
i < k(v) and CEAi(N, E, d) < di for every i ≥ k(v). By definition of the CEA-value, we have that
ϕCEAi (N, v) = Mi(v) for every i < k(v) and ϕ
CEA
i (N, v) < Mi(v) for every i ≥ k(v). Note that the play-
ers in {1, . . . , k(v)− 1} are receiving their utopia values and, therefore, they are allocated their maximum
obtainable payoffs.
Proposition 3 Let (N, v) ∈ CAn and let (N, v¯) be its associated bankruptcy game. Then, ϕCEA(N, v) ∈
m(v) + F{1,...,k(v)−1}(v¯).
Proof Recall that F{1,...,k(v)−1}(v¯) = C(v¯)∩ HN\{1,...,k(v)−1}(v¯) = C(v¯)∩ H{k(v),...,n}(v¯). By Theorem 6 and
Theorem 4, ϕCEA(N, v) ∈ CC(v) = m(v) + C(v¯).
By definition of ϕCEA and of k(v),
n
∑
j=k(v)
ϕCEAj (N, v) =
n
∑
j=k(v)
mj(v) +
n
∑
j=k(v)
CEAj(N, E, d)
=
n
∑
j=k(v)
mj(v) + v(N)− ∑
j∈N
mj(v)−
k(v)−1
∑
j=1
(Mj(v)−mj(v))
=
n
∑
j=k(v)
mj(v) + v¯({k(v), . . . , n})
where the last equality follows by definition of k(v). Therefore, ϕCEA ∈ m(v) + H{k(v),...,n}(v¯). As a
result,
ϕCEA(N, v) ∈ (m(v) + H{k(v),...,n}(v¯)) ∩ (m(v) + C(v¯)) = m(v) + F{1,...,k(v)−1}(v¯).uunionsq
Note that if k(v) > 1, then, the CEA value belongs to a specific face of the core cover polytope.
Nevertheless, Proposition 3 applied to the case k(v) = 1 indicates that ϕCEA(N, v) ∈ m(v) + C(v¯),
which is the face of the empty set. In this case, the constrained equal awards value coincides with the
egalitarian value that assigns v(N)n to every agent.
4 Core cover complexity
In this section, we describe the complexity of the core-cover of a compromise admissible game by look-
ing at the maximal number of its extreme points. Consequently, the complexity of the core of a compro-
mise stable game is also analyzed and, particularly, the complexity of the core of bankrupcty games.
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We now focus on the maximal number of extreme points of the core cover. Since the core cover is
the convex hull of the larginal vectors, it has at most n! extreme points. However, this number is never
achieved for games with at least four players. Notice that the larginal vector lσ(v) is the efficient payoff
vector giving the first players in σ their utopia payoffs as long as it is possible to assign the remaining
players their minimum rights. Therefore, for each σ ∈ Π(N), players can be divided into three groups:
those receiving their utopia payoffs (group G1), those receiving their minimum rights (group G2), and
the player which is between both groups (the pivot player). Clearly, given a game (N, v) ∈ CAn, for
each order σ, the position of the pivot player, l, varies between 1, . . . , n and depends on the vector of
minimal rights and the utopia vector.
To have some regularity inside the class of compromise admissible games, consider now the sub-
classes of compromise admissible games where the position of the pivot player is fixed. That is, take
k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, a TU game (N, v) ∈ CAnk if (N, v) ∈ CAn and, for each σ ∈ Π(N),
k−1
∑
r=1
Mσ(r)(v) +
n
∑
r=k
mσ(r)(v) < v(N) <
k
∑
r=1
Mσ(r)(v) +
n
∑
r=k+1
mσ(r)(v).
Given a game (N, v) ∈ CAnk , the pivot player is always in position k for all the larginal vectors. There
are compromise admissible games with such property as we illustrate in the following example
Example 1 Let (N, v) be a symmetric2 4-player compromise admissible game such that, for all i ∈ N,
v(S) = 0 for all S ⊂ N\{i}, v(N) = 10, and, for all i ∈ N,
1. v(N\{i}) = 0 (example of a game (N, v) ∈ CA41).
2. v(N\{i}) = 4 (example of a game (N, v) ∈ CA42).
3. v(N\{i}) = 6 (example of a game (N, v) ∈ CA43).
4. v(N\{i}) = 7 (example of a game (N, v) ∈ CA44).
In the four cases presented in Figure 1 we have C(v) = CC(v).3 However, there are compromise
admissible games in the classes CAnk where the core is a strict subset of the core cover. Consider, for
instance, the 4-player games (N, v) and (N,w) such that
v(S) =

0 if |S| = 1,
7 if |S| = 2,
0 if |S| = 3,
22 if S = N
and w(S) =

0 if |S| = 1,
7 if |S| = 2,
12 if |S| = 3,
22 if S = N
Their cores and core covers are represented in Figure 2. Clearly, (N, v) ∈ CA41 and (N,w) ∈ CA43. Be-
sides, the game (N,w) has the maximal number of core vertices (24) and, as we will show in Theorem 7,
the maximal number of core cover vertices (12).
Next, for each k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we investigate the computational complexity of a game (N, v) ∈ CAnk
attending to the maximal number of extreme points of its core cover.
Lemma 2 Let k ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
2 A TU game (N, v) is symmetric if the value of a coalition only depends on its cardinality. Although the subclasses CAnk
(k ∈ {1, . . . , n}) certainly contain games that are not symmetric, we restrict to symmetric games for easiness of exposition.
3 The graphics in Figure 1 and Figure 2 were built with the toolbox TUGlab of MATLABr (Mirás-Calvo and Sánchez-Rodríguez,
2008). The web page of TUGlab can be found in http://eio.usc.es/pub/io/xogos/index.php
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(a) Case 1. (b) Case 2.
(c) Case 3. (d) Case 4.
Fig. 1: n = 4, core covers of cases 1, 2, 3, and 4.
(a) Core cover and core of (N, v). (b) Core cover and core of (N,w).
Fig. 2: Core cover contains the core.
1. Let (N, v) ∈ CAnk . The maximal number of extreme points is given by the number n(n−1k−1).
2. The classes CAnk and CA
n
n−k+1 have the same combinatorial complexity. The maximal complexity is obtained
at k = n+12 if n is odd, and k =
n
2 (or k =
n
2 + 1) if n is even.
Proof 1. If k = 1 (respectively, k = n), the pivot player is in the first (last) position for each order
σ ∈ Π(N). Take a pivot player j ∈ N, then, all the orders σ ∈ Π(N) where j is in first (last) position
give rise to the same larginal vector (an extreme point of the core-cover). Hence, there are at most n
different larginal vectors, one for each possible pivot player.
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Take 1 < k < n and fix j ∈ N as the pivot player. Then, any group of k− 1 players out of the players
in N \ {j} receive their utopia payoffs if they are located ahead of player j according to an order
σ ∈ Π(N). As a result, there are at most (n−1k−1) different larginal vectors associated with orders where
the pivot player j is in position k. By changing the pivot player, it is proved that there are at most
n(n−1k−1) larginal vectors.
2. The first part is clear since n(n−1k−1) = n(
n−1
n−k). Moreover, n(
n−1
k−1) =
n!
(k−1)!(n−k)! = (
n
k)k and therefore it
can be seen that (nk)k ≤ ( nk+1)(k + 1) whenever k ≤ n2 . If n is even, n(n−1n2−1) = n(
n−1
n
2
) and the result
follows. If n is odd, we have just shown the result for k ≤ n−12 . Then, we need to compare the case
k = n−12 with the case k
′ = n+12 . Note that(
n
n−1
2
)
n− 1
2
=
n!
( n−12 )!(
n+1
2 )!
n− 1
2
<
n!
( n−12 )!(
n+1
2 )!
n+ 1
2
=
(
n
n+1
2
)
n+ 1
2
and the result follows.
uunionsq
From point 2 in Lemma 2, it is clear that the maximal complexity of the class of compromise admis-
sible games CAnk depends on the parity of n. For easiness of exposition, we define k0 =
n+1
2 if n is odd
and k0 = n2 if n is even.
Theorem 7 The computational complexity of the class of admissible games CAn is n(n−1n−1
2
) when n is odd and
n(n−1n−2
2
) when n is even.
Proof Take an order σ ∈ Π(N), and let k be the position of the pivot player (where k ∈ {1, . . . , n}).
Clearly, the number of larginal vectors that give rise to the same vector is given by (n− k)!(k− 1)!. By
the proof of Lemma 2, this number is minimized whenever the pivot player is in position k0.
Subsequently, we show that the core cover of a compromise admissible game has the maximal num-
ber of vertices when the pivot player is in position k0 (a middle position) for every order σ ∈ Π(N). In
other words, we show that the core cover has maximal number of vertices when the game belongs to
the class CAnk0 . Let (N, v) ∈ CAn. For each k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let pvk be the number of different core cover
vertices of the game (N, v) that arise from orders σ ∈ Π(N) such that the pivot player is in position k.
Then, the number of core cover vertices of the game (N, v) is given by ∑nk=1 p
v
k . Moreover, since each
core cover vertex corresponds to some larginal vector, the number of different orders of players in N can
be written as
n! =
n
∑
k=1
pvk(n− k)!(k− 1)! (2)
Let (N,w) ∈ CAnk0 . The number of its core cover vertices is pwk0 and
n! = pwk0(n− k0)!(k0 − 1)! (3)
Combining (2) and (3), it is obtained that
pwk0 =
n
∑
k=1
pvk
(n− k)!(k− 1)!
(n− k0)!(k0 − 1)! ≥
n
∑
k=1
pvk
where the inequality follows because (n− k)!(k− 1)! is minimized at k0, as mentioned above. Therefore,
it follows that pwk0 = n(
n−1
k0−1) gives the computational complexity of CA
n. uunionsq
As an illustration, we compare some of these maximal numbers in Table 1.
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n n! k0 n( n−1k0−1)
3 6 2 6
4 24 2 12
5 120 3 30
6 720 3 60
7 5040 4 140
...
...
...
...
Table 1: Core and core cover complexity.
Easy computations show that the ratio between the complexity of the core cover of an (n+ 1)-player
game and of an n-player game is 2 when n is odd and 2(n+1)n when n is even. Observe that this ratio is
always n+ 1 for the extreme points of the core. Besides, given an n-player game, the ratio between the
complexity of the core and the complexity of the core cover is (k0 − 1)!(n − k0)!. This shows that the
convex structure of the core cover is much simpler than the convex structure of the core.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we analyze the relationship between compromise admissible games and bankruptcy games
by establishing an identification, up to a translation, of the core cover of a compromise admissible and
the core of a particular bankruptcy game. In fact, given a compromise admissible game, first, we assign
each player his minimum right and, then, players are involved in a particular bankruptcy problem. This
bankruptcy problem has as demand vector the remainder of the utopia vector and as the estate the
remainder of v(N) once the minimum right vector is allocated.
As a consequence of this, on the one hand, the study of the core cover of a compromise admis-
sible game, from a geometric point of view, is equivalent to the analysis of the core of a bankruptcy
game. Thus, we study this core by means of its faces. All the face games are strategically equivalent
to new bankruptcy games, but with specific interpretations: a coalition of agents has priority over its
complementary coalition. Since the face games are new bankruptcy games, the same procedure can be
applied several times to define a complete hierarchical structure between coalitions. We show that the
core cover of the original game can be recovered with the core covers of the associated hierarchical
bankruptcy games. On the other hand, we can define values or allocations of v(N) among the players
based on those allocation rules which have been proposed in the context of bankruptcy problems and
that satisfy invariance under claims truncation. These allocations always propose core cover elements.
Here, we consider the CEA rule and corresponding CEA value. The CEA valeu gives some players their
utopia values whenever the value of the grand coalition, v(N), is high enough to ensure all players
their minimal right plus an extra amount, which is obtained as the smallest coordinate of the difference
between the utopia vector and the minimal rights vector. We show that the CEA value belongs to the
face of the core cover given by the coalition of players that get their utopia values. It remains to ana-
lyze the natural hierarchical structure described above to propose new rules and to find new axiomatic
characterizations.
Finally, we emphasize that the core cover polytope is much simpler than the core polytope. Their
convex structures are determined by their extreme points, and therefore, the maximal number of extreme
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points is a measure of their computational complexity. For a game with a large number of players, the
core cover has considerably less extreme points than the core.
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